Divergent patterns in the ethnic transformation of societies.

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Draft only. Comments welcome

Developed-country populations that began their fertility transitions relatively early are becoming increasingly diverse with respect to the ancestry, ethnic origin and religion of their inhabitants. This is primarily a result of high levels of immigration, particularly migration from the less developed countries. To a lesser extent, higher birth-rates of some of the immigrant populations further amplify diversity. This paper considers the possible consequences of these trends in the developed world, and whether diversity of that kind may eventually become a universal phenomenon affecting most countries.

The assumption of demographic globalisation

Many characteristics of the developed world: low death and birth rates, and possibly the new attitudes to marriage and living arrangements embodied in the ‘second demographic transition’, are becoming universal. That may be regarded as a demographic facet of globalisation. Long-term future scenarios envisage a world where economic prosperity is more universally shared, where demographic transition is complete, where population growth is over and the socio-economic and demographic composition of populations are convergent.

This paper considers whether the growing heterogeneity of Western countries today is inevitable, and what its social, economic and political consequences might be, and whether heterogeneity of populations arising from immigration might remain confined for the most part to countries currently classed as ‘developed’. Globalisation of population may be much less marked in many of those countries which began their fertility transition later and are now progressing towards full economic development. If so, the later that countries develop, the less heterogeneous they will become through migration.

Demographic transition and international migration

Large-scale migration from poor countries to the developed world is powered, in part, by the century-long gap between the onset of their respective fertility transitions. In the developed world, societies have moderated birth and death rates for about a century and are relatively old. Many have ceased to grow through their own natural increase; some are declining in number. With the exception of some former communist countries, they have become rich. They send relatively few emigrants. Poor countries, mostly with incomplete or even absent regulation of fertility, still grow rapidly, have more youthful populations, often send many emigrants and endure varying, although generally diminishing, levels of poverty.

Many migrants from those poorer countries move to the developed world. With a few exceptions such as France, their immigration comprises the greater part of population growth (Eurostat 2008a) and most future projected growth to mid-century. Nine Western European countries are projected to grow by 15 per cent or more by 2060,
primarily from immigration. Seventeen former communist countries, plus Germany, are projected to decline by up to 28 per cent by the same year (Eurostat 2008b). Many countries in Central Europe also receive immigrants from low and middle-income countries, although they do not at present compensate numerically for population loss from chronic low fertility (OECD 2007).

Transformation of population composition
Aside from its strictly demographic effects in driving population growth or mitigating decline, this migration has begun to make substantial, and presumably permanent, changes to the ethnic and religious make-up of the Western receiving countries. Populations of recent immigrants and their descendants increase, progressively diminishing the share of the native or indigenous population over time. The best-known example is the official projections by race and Hispanic origin of the population of the United States (US Bureau of the Census 2008). According to that, the minority populations together will together comprise a majority of the US population by 2042, accompanied by substantial growth in the total population by 129 million by 2050 (42 per cent), mostly through the direct and indirect effects of immigration. The Black, American Indian and other indigenous populations are, however, mostly not of immigrant origin. Setting aside those populations (in all 66.8 million by 2050) the population of recent immigrant origin is projected to comprise 36 per cent of the 2050 total.

In at least twelve other developed countries, mostly in NW Europe and the English-speaking world (Table 1), official projections document similar trends and project similar outcomes to mid-century and beyond, although on somewhat different

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Projections of foreign-origin populations from various sources.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>up to 2050 criteria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>citizenship only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>'foreign origin'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>'foreign origin'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>citizenship &amp; descendants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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</tr>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>'foreign origin'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>'foreign origin'</td>
</tr>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>citizenship only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>ethnic origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>race and Hispanic origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>aboriginal populations only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>aboriginal populations only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 'foreign origin' or 'foreign background' usually taken to include foreign immigrants plus those with one or both parents foreign immigrant.

Projections of 'foreign origin' usually include 'citizenship' and immigrants.

(i.e. two generations). The third generation is assumed to converge to close to, or same as, the national average.
Migration is usually held constant. The mortality of all groups is mostly assumed to follow the national projected trend. Individual groups are often clustered into 'Western background' and 'non-Western background' or similar broad classification.

Definitions. Most do not use ‘ethnic’ or ‘racial’ criteria and include only the first and second generations (see Coleman 2006). These projections incorporate migration and fertility rates separately according to various national origins. In that way their impact on the composition of the population, given the continuation of specified, usually current migration levels, and convergent assumptions of fertility rates, can be estimated. In most of the projections the foreign-origin population is defined to include both the first immigrant generation and the second generation born in the host country. The third generation is generally assumed to be assimilated to the national population and to become Dutch, Swedish etc, thus disappearing from statistical view. However, potentially permanent ‘ethnic’ categories are employed in the projections for the English-speaking countries.

On these projections, between 15 per cent and 30 per cent of the total population is expected to be of first or second generation origin by mid-century, in some cases not far short of the equivalent projected proportion in the United States. In many of the European projections, however, up to one third of the projected foreign-origin totals are from other European or from other developed countries. In all cases the projected proportion of foreign origin population increases in nearly linear fashion up to the end of the projection period (mostly 2050 or 2060).

On those conservative assumptions, the foreign-origin proportions of those populations are projected to rise to between about 15 per cent and 30 per cent by mid-century with almost linear rates of change (Figure 2). The proportion of the foreign-origin populations with non-European backgrounds is expected to increase from about one half today to about two thirds by mid-century, up to 20 per cent of the total population. The composition of the population by origin does not necessarily determine the degree of social or economic salience of these differences. That would depend upon the degree of integration and social assimilation, including inter-ethnic union.

Relative importance of migration and of differential fertility

Migration assumptions are more important than fertility assumptions in determining this outcome. Taking all minority groups together, ethnic minority or ‘foreign origin’ total fertility in most European countries is not great: for example in France in 1991-8, 2.5 compared with 1.65 for women born in France. Corrected for distortions in childbearing due to the migration process, these figures become 2.16 and 1.70 respectively (Toulemon 2004, t 2, t. 3) A similar differential can be seen in the UK in respect of birthplace of mother, and of ethnic origin in 2001 (ONS 2008 FM1 table 9.5, Coleman and Scherbov 2005). Youthful age-structure, of course, ensures a disproportionate contribution to births for the time being. Some groups, mostly Muslim or of African origin, have notably higher fertility but in common with other groups, these are declining. Most projections assume eventual convergence or at least stabilisation at a total fertility around 2.0 at most. The fertility of the Hispanic population in the US is, proportionately, the largest minority in these
Figure 2: 
Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin as per cent of total population in selected countries of Europe, 2000-2050

projections with a high birth rate, and its fertility is projected to decline only relatively slowly. Migration flows, by contrast, are very high in some counties compared with the annual total of births (Table 3). In Spain, Switzerland and Italy, net foreign immigration either exceeds the annual number of births or is close to it.

Table 3  
Selected Western countries
Comparisons of live births, net immigration and natural increase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population 1st Jan 08</th>
<th>Live births</th>
<th>Natural increase</th>
<th>Net immigration</th>
<th>Immigration as percent of births</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>data in thousands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>44475</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>7509</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>59131</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4681</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10585</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
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<td>8299</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5447</td>
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<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>60817</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France mét</td>
<td>61538</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>82315</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>-141</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro total</td>
<td>355968</td>
<td>3792</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>1752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>21015</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>213</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>33311</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>204</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>4263</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>298363</td>
<td>4217</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Eurostat, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Canada, Statistics
Note: US data refer to 2006, Australia, Canada and New Zealand to 2007. Net immigration data not available for US. Admission for permanent settlement in 2006 was 1,266,264. Figure reduced by 1/3 to allow for return migration.

Projections of foreign populations are not available in respect of many of these countries; for example Spain, Italy, Belgium. But the data above indicate that transitions in population composition must be proceeding similar to those depicted in Figure 2.

The relative power of migration is easily shown by comparing the projected outcome in terms of population composition with, and without migration. Without migration, minority proportionate growth is relatively slow and eventually stops – or even declines in those European projections which assume that all persons with foreign background become ‘native’ after two generations. With the assumption of current migration, the growth in foreign-origin proportions is continually upwards (Figure 2).

Demography as destiny?
Migration trends are the most volatile of the three components of demographic change; driven by often unconnected economic, demographic and political developments in the numerous sending countries and in the receiving country itself. Migration is much more subject to government policy than are birth or death rates, all the more because the direction of migration policy – restrictive or promotional – can change radically between successive governments (Hollifield 2000).

The projected ethnic changes—based on unchanged migration flows—are therefore by no means inevitable but depends on migration policy as well as on many unpredictable developments (including, of course, the recent economic collapse). Especially in liberal democracies, migration is much easier to encourage than to limit (Freeman 1994); governments have limited their freedom of action by subscribing to international conventions on human rights and asylum, facilitating the migration of spouses, other relations and dependants that has dominated legal migration streams to the developed world in recent decades. But migration can go down as well as up, as the recent experience of Germany and the Netherlands has shown. Variant projections show that the assumed level of migration is the most powerful factor in these outcomes; alternative assumptions about differential fertility make little difference. As migration is by far the most uncertain of the components of projection, such projections can only show the consequences of specified assumptions and reality may change radically. However immigration to Western Europe and similar overseas countries has been high and rising for some years and has been encouraged by government policy in the US, Canada, Australia, the UK, although recently the UK government has somewhat reined in its previous enthusiasm.

Projection of migration levels is exceptionally difficult; most projections assume the continuation of current levels of migration, for want of any demonstrably preferable alternative. At least that shows the consequences of things continuing as they are. Until 2008 it seemed reasonable to assume that high levels of migration, and a positive approach to immigration was set fair to continue among the governments of
the English speaking world, although in Europe, policy has been more volatile and more likely to be reversed by political change. Despite opposition from electorates, upward pressures are strong, from the growing population of immigrant voters and their pressure groups; from the demands of employers for easy access to labour, from hopes that migration might avert demographic deficiencies, from the difficulty of stopping illegal immigration; all supported by pro-immigration sympathies of liberal elites. Despite low levels of immigrant workforce participation throughout Western Europe, demand for overseas labour continued to be underwritten by the European social model of welfare, retirement policies and labour laws which accommodate relatively high levels of native unemployment and low levels of workforce participation.

Since the economic downturn of 2008/9 the picture looks somewhat different. Economic trends may not affect spouse and dependant migration and may enhance asylum claiming. But strictly economic migration is likely to fall, especially as rising unemployment sharpens native resentment of immigrant workers. Published migration data are often a year late and have hardly begun to reflect the new economic environment. But some early figures already show a downturn in flows. For example, registrations of new workers in the UK from the Eastern European A8 countries fell to 26,815 in Q4 2008, almost halved from the 50,820 in Q4 2007 (HomeOffice/UKBorderAgency 2009) table 1.

**Figure 2**

*Projection of UK ethnic minority populations 2001-2051 on two assumptions (1000s)*

Inter-ethnic unions

In reality, the growth of the number of children from mixed unions, and of children with mothers or fathers themselves of mixed origin, complicates and blurs these ethnic or ‘foreign origin’ distinctions. In statistics, however, persons of more than one origin do not - indeed cannot - feature in most of the projections by origin made in European countries. Those define ‘foreign origin’ or ‘foreign background’ on the basis of the birthplaces or citizenships of the subjects and of their parents, as recorded in the population registers. Registers are the basis of most Continental population and
migration statistics. Nonetheless children of mixed parentage comprise an increasing proportion of all ‘minority’ populations where it is possible to record them, and their diversity is beginning to erode the usefulness of conventional classifications of origin. For example, following the incorporation of multi-ancestry population categories into the questions on race in the US census, the US projections now require for their full presentation a table with 26 rows (Bureau of the Census 2008, see also Goldstein and Morning 2002). In the US the parents of children of multiple origin are themselves mostly described as having multiple origins (Hollmann and Kingcade 2005). In the British census of 2001, 661,200 people voluntarily identified themselves as ‘mixed’ (1.1 per cent of the UK population), or were so identified by their parents, and 7.27 million in the US census of 2000 (2.6 per cent; (Jones 2005)). In the 2001 census of England and Wales, 8 per cent of children born 1990-2001 were recorded as having a different ethnic group from their mothers, and 22 per cent of children of non-white mothers (ONS Commissioned table CO431) although by no means all those children were classified as ‘mixed’.

Taking mixed unions into account, the mixed populations in the UK are projected to increase from 661,200 in 2001 (1.1 per cent) to 3.5 million by mid-century (5 per cent of the projected total), by that time the joint largest ethnic group (the other being African) (Coleman 2007). A different, experimental probabilistic projection of the growth of the mixed population in the UK gave a median value of 8 per cent of the total population ‘mixed’ by 2050, and 26 per cent of infants, and 29 per cent ‘mixed’ by the end of the century. By that time, the median size of the white population was projected to be 41 per cent of the total, and the ‘mixed’ populations would be roughly twice as numerous as the Asian populations taken together, and the Black populations taken together. ((Coleman and Scherbov 2005)). A high prevalence of inter-ethnic unions would moderate the growth of immigrant-origin populations strictly defined, while introducing a new diversity from rapidly growing heterogeneous populations of mixed origin. These may eventually defy categorisation and become a very numerous, if diffuse, population.

A universal globalised trend?

Data from a wider range of countries in table 3 suggests that this is a near-universal phenomenon in Western Europe and is beginning to make itself felt in Eastern Europe as well. It is further advanced in the English-speaking world outside Europe but less in the larger developed countries in the Far East, for example Korea and especially Japan. Marked, divergent divisions have emerged across the world in the proportion of immigrants comprising total populations. On a broad-brush basis, the proportions of immigrants in the developed realms of Oceania (mostly Australia and New Zealand), North America and Europe have shown consistent increases in their proportions born overseas; in the less developed regions the proportions of immigrants are only a fraction of those elsewhere and, overall, have been diminishing (Table 4). The number of migrants in the less developed realm has of course increased, but not in step with overall population growth. Altogether, in 1960, according to the United Nations (UnitedNations 2005), 43 per cent of the world’s international migrants were in the more developed counties, 57 per cent in the less developed. By 2005 those proportions had almost reversed; to 61 per cent and 39 percent respectively. Furthermore, a substantial
Table 4 Percent of populations that are migrants, major world regions 1960 - 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>World</th>
<th>More developed</th>
<th>Less developed</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7.6</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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<td>16.3</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The proportion of immigration to the three major regions of the more developed realm has been from outside the region, while most of the migration in the less developed world is within the region and often between neighbouring countries.

**Foreign immigrant populations in the third world**

This discussion is concerned with the prospect of large-scale migration flows arising from substantial, but mostly transient, demographic and economic imbalances within and between world regions. Such migration is over and above the normal migratory exchanges that always arise between (especially) neighbouring countries, in the less developed world as elsewhere. A few comments about that migration would be appropriate. In 1960 about 60 per cent of the world’s international migrants had moved from one less-developed country to another, although by 2005 that had fallen to 40%. Many less-developed countries have quite large numbers of foreign residents from neighbouring states, even when all are relatively, though not equally poor and where there are few regional ‘champions’. Numbers can fluctuate according to economic boom and bust, policy change and political crisis, and are not well recorded.

In Africa, many are refugees in the broad sense. 2 per cent of the population overall are known to be international migrants, and the proportion has not increased in a decade. In sub-Saharan Africa, 69 per cent of migrants stayed within the region in 2005, while 80 per cent of migration from North Africa was to Europe. A few large counties have immigrant proportions approaching European levels, mostly from neighbouring African countries: Ivory Coast 13 per cent in 2005, Ghana 7.5 per cent. Except for small counties most of the rest have 2 per cent or less of migrant population. In Latin America the larger countries have large numbers, but relatively small proportions, of immigrants: Argentina 3.9%, Venezuela 3.6%, Chile 1.4%, Brazil 0.3%. Smaller countries, as is often the case, can have higher proportions e.g. Costa Rica 9.8% (data for 2005, from IOM 2008). The very large populations of Asia have even smaller proportions of immigrants (although large absolute numbers): India 0.5%, Bangladesh 0.7 per cent, Pakistan 2.1 per cent including many Afghan refugees.
Trends tending to diminish global ethnic diversity
The process of population and ethnic change has not been symmetrical. While the composition of the population of the developed world, especially of its cities, come more to resemble that of the third world through migration, settled populations of European and other origins are diminishing, some to the point of extinction, in many areas outside Europe. The developed world becomes more heterogeneous, the third world less so. In earlier centuries, European emigration had radical and sometimes catastrophic consequences for the indigenous populations of the lands that they settled; almost eliminating them in Australia and the United States, creating new mestizo populations of various shades in South America; introducing new variety by their own migration and by those of their African slaves and Asian indentured labourers throughout the world, from Trinidad to Fiji. Now the situations are reversed.

In the first half of the calamitous 20th century, ethnic diversity diminished in many of the countries Europe. Re-drawing the map of Europe at Versailles dismembered multi-ethnic empires, although some of the treaty creations were themselves multi-ethnic nation states (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) that proved to be fragile. The reduction of Hungary diminished Romanian and other minorities in Hungarian territory by creating new Hungarian minorities in Romania, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere. But overall the effect was of ethnic simplification, albeit within more constricted national boundaries. The elimination of most of Europe’s Jews in the 1940s, and the severe diminution of its gypsy and other minorities, was altogether of a much more savage kind.. At the end of the war and after it, forced migration removed most of the German populations from Mitteleuropa, a process now more or less completed in peacetime by the opportunities of return given to ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and Russia under the German Basic Law. The whole of Poland and Polish populations was moved 200 miles further West; Poland’s diminished population, formerly diverse, was 95% Polish by the late 1940s (Kosinski 1970).

Looking further afield, at various times in the last century European populations, both ancient and those of more recent immigrant origin, have almost completely disappeared from many regions outside Europe, leaving behind a more homogeneous population. Today the 70 million population of Turkey includes substantial numbers of Kurds, Circassians and Georgians. But, following the Armenian genocide of 1915 and the population exchange with Greece from 1923 and later measures, the country has lost most of its (aboriginal) Greeks and Armenians. Numbers are uncertain but there may remain between 15 -20,000 Greeks and 40 - 60,000 Armenians, compared with perhaps 3 million of each at the beginning of that century. They were numerically dominant in the early middle ages. Following the creation of the State of Israel, the Jews of most Middle Eastern countries have departed. Christians in the Middle East, mostly of ancient - but not European - origin, are diminishing fast (Dalrymple 1997).

Permanently resident European-origin populations, mostly of colonial origin dating from the 19th and early 20th centuries, have almost completely disappeared from North Africa and Egypt, and from most of sub-Saharan Africa except for South Africa. Altogether these once numbered several million. Thus in the French former territories in about 1935 there were 1.48 million Europeans, in the British (not including the Dominions such as India and South Africa) about 735,000; in all about 4.16 million of European origin (Kuczynski 1937, Chapter 2). By 1950 that total had increased to
over 5 million people. Thirty years later those numbers had diminished to perhaps a tenth. In Algeria there remained only about 75,000 Europeans, just 45,000 French, mostly expatriates. Between 800,000 and 1 million people of Portuguese origin left Angola and Mozambique after the Portuguese Revolution ended colonial wars in 1974. Southern Africa still has a numerous but diminishing white native-born population, mostly of British and Dutch origin, the latter dating from the early 17th century. In Zimbabwe, that has fallen to a fraction of its peak number of about 250,000. According to the South African Institute of Race Relations, the white population of South Africa fell by 840,000 from 1995 (5.2 million) to 2005 (4.3 million) – mostly due to the emigration of young adults and their children. Most other former colonies worldwide have lost their (often native-born) white minorities, perhaps the most numerous of which were the Dutch population who fled what is now Indonesia in 1950. Except for Southern Africa, those that remain are mostly expatriates, not long-term residents or native-born.

This process is not limited to European-origin populations. In a number of less-developed countries, non-European ‘market-dominant’ ethnic minorities have found themselves expelled by newly-independent governments, such as the Asian populations of Kenya and Uganda in (1973), or massacred as were many Chinese in Indonesia in 1965/66 and 1998, and the Ibos of Nigeria in the 1960s. The massacres of Tutsis in Rwanda, particularly in 1994, are also claimed to be of this kind (Chua, 2003, Ch. 7).

Various formerly cosmopolitan cities such as Alexandria and Constantinople, have accordingly become much more culturally and racially homogeneous with the departure of Greeks, Jews and others (Courbage and Fargues 1997), while a reverse process of diversification through new immigration transforms London, Paris, New York, Auckland, Singapore and elsewhere.

The future

Contrary to the expectations of globalisation theory, ethnic diversification of world population is therefore far from uniform and in some cases proceeds in opposite directions. Those rich countries that began the demographic transition first were accordingly the first to be able to increase at hitherto unprecedented rates. Aided by earlier developments in navigation, military technique, trade and political organisation, by about 1900 those countries managed to colonise the greater part of the Earth’s surface and its populations. Only China, Japan, Thailand and Ethiopia among larger countries avoided foreign rule. Where indigenous populations were sparse or technically backward, colonisation was permanent and a more (North America, Australia) or less (South America, New Zealand) complete population replacement followed. Elsewhere, the situation of minority settler or governing populations became more demographically precarious as death rates began to fall among the indigenous peoples and their numbers increased in turn, and as the latter acquired the technical means – especially military – of the ruling minority. Relative population growth and the globalisation of techniques, and of concepts of liberty and democracy, originating from some of the colonisers themselves contributed to their demographic and political eclipse and withdrawal.

Now almost all the less-developed world is at some stage of demographic transition, with considerable if diminishing rates of population growth arising from high net
reproduction and prolonged by the momentum of still youthful age-structures. The obvious destinations for the excess populations of those counties still in transition are the richer post-transitional countries, whose natural increase is over and whose populations are ageing and in a few cases declining. That migration, together with the natural increase of the migrant populations, generates the ethnic diversity described above.

*How far will diversification through migration continue?*

Can the countries that currently send the migrants expect to experience migration in their turn, and the diversity resulting from it, as they themselves complete the demographic transition, run out of population momentum and begin to age, decline, and become economically attractive to migrants? To some extent, the experience of Western Europe and the US is already being reproduced in countries outside Europe as their economies have developed and their surplus population is absorbed by their growing demand for labour. They too have attracted asymmetrical immigration streams from poorer neighbouring countries. In a few cases wealth has preceded demographic transition, particularly the oil-revenue *rentier* economies of the gulf, where 8.7 million workers from other Asian countries have migrated. There, oil money flowed in independently of indigenous economic transition, permitting a high standard of living in parallel with only a slow and late decline in fertility and high levels of population growth. Manual and white collar work is done predominantly by expatriates who in some cases outnumber the local population. Although the presence of so many Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Philippines, Europeans, Americans and others makes the populations currently very diverse, that is not intended to be permanent. Citizens and foreigners really comprise quite separate populations: expatriates neither wish to nor are able to integrate, naturalise, enjoy permanent residence or family re-union.

More interesting and more typical are those formerly ‘third world’ populations that have been through more ‘conventional’ demographic and economic transition and social modernisation: first and foremost, Japan, followed by Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong. China, Malaysia, Thailand and others are less advanced examples. All sent numerous emigrants to richer countries before and during their economic and demographic transitions and the latter three still do. Now with demographic transition complete or well under way and rapid economic growth, immigration is increasing with concomitant increases in the number of immigrant workers per 1000 persons in the labour force.

So far, most of this migration is intra-regional, from culturally and linguistically similar countries. In small rich city states such as Hong Kong (43 per cent in 2005) Macau (56 per cent) and Singapore (43 per cent) about half the population is immigrant. Larger countries have much smaller proportions: Japan 1.6 per cent, Korea 1.2 per cent. Japan in particular remains exceptional in its low immigration to a rich country. There is unusual tension between employers’ demands for labour and a popular and political desire to protect Japanese society from the kind of diversity that characterises older rich countries. In attempting to resolve this dilemma, Japanese policy attracted back to Japan descendants of the Japanese who emigrated to Brazil at the beginning of the 20th century. They now number about 1.4 million. The 302,000 Brazilians in Japan by 2005 were the third largest immigrant group. But they were welcomed for a Japanese origin which they had mostly lost: they had adopted
Brazilian culture, and speak Portuguese (Higuchi 2006). Looking Japanese is one thing; behaving Japanese is quite another. Thailand, with 1.6 per cent of its population immigrant, is shifting from a migrant- sending to a migrant receiving country. Malaysia, where immigrants (65 per cent of whom are from Indonesia) comprise 6.5 per cent of the population, has already done so (all data from (InternationalOrganisationforMigration 2008).

Divergent destinies
This uneven timing of the demographic transition in different countries and regions of the world seems likely to create significant divergence in the level of national ethnic and religious homogeneity. Globalisation and the migration that goes with it will affect the composition of all populations. But the growing diversity, mostly from immigration, currently transforming most of the Western countries may not be repeated among those countries which join the rich countries’ low fertility club much later than others. Countries in the developing world have traditionally comprised many ancient minority groups, and formerly dominant ones from invasions. But the larger countries at least seem unlikely to acquire much additional diversity from new large-scale migration. The later their transition, the more they are likely to retain the basic pattern of their original population composition. However, their internal diversity may shift as indigenous minorities, or culturally distinct regions; e.g. North versus South India, follow the fertility transition at different speeds (or stall on it).

Four obstacles to the globalisation of diversity.
There are four possible obstacles in the way of a globalisation of diversity at the level currently developing in Europe and the US. First is the sequential nature of demographic transition and economic development across the world. The second is relative population size. The third is past and current politics; the lack of imperial connections transcending major regions of the countries concerned with even poorer area, and greater capacity of counties which are not democratic to resist unwanted forms of migration. The fourth is climate change.

The first set of economically developed post-transitional societies, with less than a billion population, comprise about a 15% minority of the world’s total. By comparison, potential migrant-supplying populations are very large. The total population of the migrant-sending regions is over four times that of western Europe; in the case of the Indian sub-continent vis-a-vis the UK, about 30 to 1. While those countries remain poor, the potential supply of immigrants is effectively inexhaustible. In the long run, though, the pool of potential migrants may become relatively small in relation to that of destination countries, and geographically remote and historically unconnected. The combined population of the next group to develop, led by Japan and then the ‘four dragons’, is less than 200 million, or about 300 million if Thailand and Malaysia are included. That is still relatively small in relation to even regional, never mind world populations of less developed status. But as other, larger counties move only slightly later from population growth to stability, from demographic bonus to population ageing, from labour surplus to labour shortage, the position may begin to look rather different. The future size of many less developed countries, in conjunction with the development in potential sending countries, may make it demographically more difficult for European-type minority proportions to arise. It is not easy to imagine immigration streams large enough to transform the populations of India (peaking at about 2 billion) or of China (peaking at about 1.4 billion), nor of
Bangladesh, Brazil Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Vietnam or Yemen (peak population 144 m in 2100). They may people other countries, they are less likely to be transformed by immigration themselves.

Table 5 presents a selection of larger countries currently at different stages of economic and demographic development. The data show the projected population in 2050, the years at which population will reach its maximum before declining, reach replacement level fertility, zero natural increase and an aged potential support ratio of 4 (that is, the number of persons aged 15-64 for every person aged 65 and over). These variables, together with projected GDP per head in 2030, could indicate the approximate period at which those countries become attractive to immigrants from poorer countries, and when domestic employers will begin demanding them.

Together with China, seven other large countries totalling 900 million people, 2.3 billion in all, have already reached replacement fertility or will do so within a few years. Demographic momentum will maintain population growth for longer; most except China are still projected to show modest natural increase by 2050. At least before recent crises, all were projected to become richer. Their aged potential support ratio is projected to fall to about four within about 30 years, in China much sooner. That is the current level in most European and other developed countries today, at which population ageing becomes a serious concern and the bulges in domestic workforce retire into elderly dependence. GDP per head will be around $10,000 per year or more, still only a half to a third of that of the current rich world but four times or more that of many remaining counties that are less developed.

Poorer countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia, Egypt and the less developed Latin American countries will no doubt continue to export people. Closer to mid-century, their population surpluses may also be running out. Beyond that, the remaining sources of potential large-scale migration would have to come primarily from sub-Saharan Africa and from a few large Asian countries with delayed

Some basic data for estimating future potential migration for larger countries at different stages of economic and demographic transition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Estimated population in 2008 (millions)</th>
<th>Projected population in 2050 (millions)</th>
<th>Year of maximum population</th>
<th>Year of projected TF = 2.1 (or per 1000)</th>
<th>Year of projected RNI = 0</th>
<th>Year of projected PSR = 4</th>
<th>GDP per head in 2030 (1000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2024</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>33.666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>2023</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2027</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>30.643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>2050</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2030</td>
<td>2032</td>
<td>14.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1336.9</td>
<td>1416.3</td>
<td>2032</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2037</td>
<td>2027</td>
<td>15.763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>2050</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2047</td>
<td>10.789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>192.0</td>
<td>218.5</td>
<td>2045</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2032</td>
<td>8.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>2050</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2042</td>
<td>13.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>227.2</td>
<td>287.6</td>
<td>2050</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2042</td>
<td>6.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>108.6</td>
<td>129.0</td>
<td>2043</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2037</td>
<td>10.668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>118.0</td>
<td>2050</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2042</td>
<td>8.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>160.1</td>
<td>222.5</td>
<td>2050</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1181.5</td>
<td>1613.7</td>
<td>2050</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>2050</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2047</td>
<td>8.292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
transitions, notably Pakistan. By mid-century many currently less developed populations should be approaching ‘demographic maturity’. Population ageing will impose new demands on their domestic population resources, and further economic growth should have moderated the attractions of emigration. In the very long run the world will start to run out of potential migrants. Demand for labour arising from population ageing will have to be met more from domestic sources. When they become economically developed, therefore, the future population composition of some large currently developing countries may not have changed much from that of the present, except where their national territory already include regional populations or indigenous minority groups at different stages in fertility transition. In China, these number only about 5 per cent of the population. India, however, is a complex mosaic where internal differentials in fertility transition may alter the future ethnic and religious population balance even without substantial immigration.

Political contrasts
Political considerations also militate against a ‘European’ experience being closely repeated in all other countries. Most immigration into Europe since the 1970s has been of dependants, spouses, students, asylum seekers or illegal. Many may work but they did not enter as part of a formal labour recruitment stream. This inflow was greatly facilitated by the adoption of human rights and asylum conventions by liberal democracies. Such liberal democracies do not find it easy to control immigration (Freeman 1994) even when public opinion, as it frequently does, favours control. Many non-European countries do not adhere to such conventions and, pace Fukuyama (Fukuyama 1992), may be unlikely to develop Western-type liberal systems or adopt human rights conventions in the foreseeable future. Indeed some argue that the acquisition of forms of democracy without liberal structures, accentuates hostility to minorities and immigrants by focussing attention on relative numbers and ethnically-focused interests (Chua 2003) Middle Eastern and African states, and some Asian ones can and do control migration effectively, prevent the settlement of dependants and remove en masse migrants whose presence is not required. Mass expulsions of Palestinians from the Middle East, and of Ghanaians and others from Nigeria are cases in point. The constrained position of the very large migrant labour populations in the Gulf States was noted earlier. Highly developed non-Western countries where the rule of law is fully established, notably Japan, have also controlled immigration.
and kept immigrants constitutionally at arm’s length, more effectively than European
countries have wished or been able to do.

**Climate change**
The intervention of climate change may push migration patterns onto very different
paths and throw a spanner into the speculations outlined above. Initially, climate
change was believed to be progressing slowly, with its dire effects measurable on a
century-long scale (Manabe et al 2004). While demographers recognised the effects of
population on climate change (Meyerson 1998) effects of climate on population
seemed far off. Climate change was not mentioned by the UN as a possible constraint
in a projection to 2300 made in 2002 (UnitedNations 2004)), although commentators
drew attention to the likely constraints of climate change on projected growth (Dyson
2004). Ecological constraints, while mentioned in the UN projections to 2150 of
eleven years ago, were not incorporated in them. Even without global warming,
sustainable population is notoriously difficult to estimate: the middle half of Cohen’s
range of long-term carrying capacity estimates lay between 5 billion and 30 billion
(Cohen 1996; UnitedNations 1998), p 36). These possible constraints are not repeated
in the revised long-term projections (UnitedNations 2000). Other projections,
however, have attempted to incorporate negative feedbacks. (Lutz, Sanderson et al.
2003).

But recent analyses point to a faster the pace of climate change, and weaker prospects
of averting it (Dyson 2005). Important (mostly damaging) climate changes are now
expected within the conventional 50-year time-horizon of population projections.
Some models forecast a rise of 4 degrees C by mid-century. Even with a rise of
between 2 and 4 degrees there is a strong possibility that serious climatic problems
will arise and furthermore that they will arise not progressively but in a sudden, non-
linear fashion (Lenton et al 2007): the near – certainty of the loss of Arctic summer
ice, and less likely and later on of the Greenland Ice Sheet, the West Antarctic Ice
sheet, the beginning of the conversion of the Amazon rainforest to savannah and the
overturning of the North Atlantic circulation that keeps NW Europe temperate. Rising
sea levels would affect millions of people in African and Asian delta areas and Pacific
islands, and higher temperatures would damage agriculture (Battisti et al 2009)
making some areas increasingly uninhabitable. Most scenarios suggest that, while
some high Northern latitudes and other areas will benefit, severe environmental
damage will be inflicted on some of the poorest and most marginal tropical and
subtropical areas, notably sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian subcontinent (Martin
2007) making human populations unsustainable there, as well as in Australia,
Southern Europe and other developed areas.

The double uncertainties of climate warming and of demographic response to it make
the magnitude of numbers of people potentially displaced by future climate change
very difficult to estimate. 25 million people are already claimed to be ‘environmental
refugees’, although not necessarily just as a result of global warming. A widely-cited
estimate of the number of persons likely to be displaced by future climate change is
250 million. It is mentioned because it is the only estimate. Climate change has
already been cited as contributing to the flight of about a million Africans across the
Mediterranean to Southern Europe in recent years (Myers, 2001, 2005). Large
numbers of people could not be accommodated in poor neighbouring African or Asian
countries if the scale of environmental damage were great and if many parts of each
region can no longer sustain large populations; all would be suffering to some extent. The most attractive option would be movement to the developed world, much of which would be less affected and has greater resources. That would disrupt in ways impossible to simulate the sequence of migrations sketched above, as well as damaging severely the assumed economic progress that underlies the demographic and economic projections. Migration might continue to be focussed on Western Europe and North America, not to more vulnerable areas whose economic growth might be stifled. Some predictions could be made though; India would surely find itself hosting a large part of the population of Bangladesh. Bangladeshis already comprise a big component of the 5.7 million immigrants in India.

Long-term consequences
Setting aside the unpredictable consequences of severe climate change, what would be the consequences of different patterns of ethnic transformation? In today’s developed world, continuation of current levels of immigration for just a few more decades would raise the foreign-origin proportion of the population to between 20-30 percent of the projected mid-century total. Further change would be built into the age-structure. In the UK projection, for example, while 80% of the 2051 projected population would be of British origin, only 54% of the 0-14 age group, and just 52% of the 0-4 year olds would be of ‘indigenous’ origin. If continued further to the end of the century and beyond, immigration combined with below-replacement fertility of the indigenous population would lead to the eventual displacement of the original population from its majority position, both nationally and, earlier, in major cities. However, some of the developments described above make that outcome rather unlikely. And the exact balance, though much talked about in some circles, would hardly be crucial. But in that eventuality the character, identity and cohesion of relatively could hardly remain unchanged. The prospect of progressive ethnic transition, labelled a ‘third demographic transition’ (Coleman 2006) raises political and philosophical considerations untouched by earlier demographic transitions. The social, cultural and political impact of the projected changes could be substantial, indeed transforming. Depending on the level of adaptation, small scale, urban daily life outside the home could be conducted more and more in the company of people who might be regarded as strangers, and the distribution of an older indigenous population increasingly confined to suburban and rural areas.

On the larger scale, unless integration became more successful than it has been to date, national identity and the perception of national interests would become more complex and possibly contentious, and older national history and formerly shared myths and values increasingly irrelevant to a newer population. The culture to be taught in schools, whose history if any is already a vexed question. Popular opinion, expressed in opinion polls, tends to object to such developments. Postmodern elite opinion is more nuanced, feeling that society should have evolved beyond identities defined by religion and nation and its past (Fukuyama 2007). Some find it difficult to articulate acceptable reasons for objecting to the prospect of ethnic change, others actively welcome a more diverse society on various liberal humanitarian grounds or because of a distaste for the current nature of their society.

Whether minority religions, especially Islam, retained their ethnic associations and customs or developed a new form would be especially important. Much would depend on the origins of the immigrant populations, their desire to integrate or otherwise, and
the policies put in place on integration and immigration. But with such a major transition in origins in a relatively short historical time, shifting numerical balance would make it difficult to insist on (former) minority populations adapting to former ‘majority’ identities or values. It could be that the former majority would have to do the adapting. Slower inflows might facilitate a gradual accommodation, moderated differences more taken for granted in a prosperous welfare society at peace with itself.

There might be important consequences for foreign policy. Already European countries with many Asian and Middle Eastern voters find themselves drawn into overseas conflicts where important sections of the electorates have specific ancestral loyalties or grievances (Armenia, Kurdistan, the Punjab, Kashmir, Israel, the Muslim world in general). Parliamentary representation, possibly the outcome of elections, may depend on the position taken by candidates on such matters. Defining the ‘national interest becomes more difficult, and the orientation of foreign policy may change. For example it has been suggested that the traditional orientation of US policy towards Europe will make less sense to future American electorates. a high proportion of whom will have origins in South America or Asia, quite apart from global shifts in the balance of power and realpolitik.

Former sending counties, however, by virtue of their very large populations, their different policies on admission or integration, or some eventual global shortage of suitable labour migrants may retain a more traditional and more relatively homogeneous population composition. That may be of assistance to them in preserving national identity and community of purpose. And by no means all are ‘liberal democracies’ strongly concerned with rights and conventions. In the long run, the former sending countries, lacking such fissiparous foreign policy pressure arising from imported minority loyalties, might retain a reasonably coherent national interest in their foreign policy. The countries that developed early, by virtue of the special interests of their substantial immigrant-origin populations, would by contrast have to incorporate, or at least take into account, concerns proper to foreign governments in their own policy. Clearer foreign policy and interests would be to the diplomatic advantage of the new emerging countries. Countries coming late to demographic and economic transition might not share, at least for a long time, the ethnic diversification characteristic of the pioneers in transition, while the original cultures of the later would be to some extent lost, or at least modified or marginalised. Were that to be the case, the ‘third demographic transition’ mentioned earlier would not be a transition at all, but would remain incomplete at global level.
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